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Abstract 
Previous literature shows that activation requirements for welfare participants decrease 
welfare participation. However, the dynamics have not been examined, and often only 
exit effects are analyzed. In this paper, we look more closely at the transition rates into 
and out of welfare. Using register data on the entire population of Stockholm, we are 
able to capture how both entry and exit rates were affected when activation require-
ments were introduced at different times in Stockholm’s city districts. The results indi-
cate that the main reduction in welfare participation is due to a small increase in exit 
rates. The part of the population that is at risk of entering into welfare, though, expe-
riences a reduction in entry rates due to the reform. There are also heterogeneous ef-
fects, namely, large effects on entry rates for young individuals. In addition, there are 
larger effects on exit rates for unmarried individuals without children compared to the 
population as a whole. 
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2  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants 1 Introduction 
There is a broad consensus that the welfare state has the responsibility of providing 
economic support to poor individuals. However, the form that poverty alleviation 
should take is a much-debated issue because receiving benefits generally conflicts with 
retaining work incentives. Throughout history, it has been common to require poor in-
dividuals to provide some service to society to prove themselves to be “worthy” of sup-
port. This view was particularly prominent in England during the 19th century, where 
the poor were required to move to workhouses to receive financial aid. This was also 
common in Sweden for some time, as was requiring the poor to take low-paying so-
called “emergency jobs” (nödarbeten). During the postwar expansion of the welfare 
state in Sweden, these policies began to be used less frequently. Nevertheless, in the last 
twenty years, work requirements and activation programs have again been discussed as 
ways of creating “the correct incentives” for recipients of social assistance
1 both in 
Sweden and in other industrialized countries. 
Mandatory activation requirements may imply very different things. In a strong ver-
sion known as “workfare” programs, the welfare recipient is required to work in some 
publicly provided job to retain assistance. Weaker versions may merely mandate par-
ticipation in a job preparation or job search program. There are also optional activation 
programs in which noncompliance does not always lead to sanctions. 
Most theoretical work on activation requirements for welfare recipients focuses on 
incentive effects in an optimal taxation framework
2. It is generally explicitly or impli-
citly assumed that required work is not productive (or at least is less productive than 
market work) and does not improve human capital; it only provides incentives. Besley 
and Coate (1992) show that the incentive effects of mandatory activation are twofold. In 
the short run, it will induce individuals to refrain from applying for welfare or to exit 
welfare faster if they have some possibility of supporting themselves because there is an 
implicit cost associated with welfare use. Furthermore, in the longer run, people may 
make choices that reduce the risk of becoming welfare dependent in the future, for ex-
                                                 
1 We will use the words ‘welfare’ and ‘social assistance’ (American and Swedish terms, respectively) as equivalents. 
2 See, for example, Chambers (1989), Brett (1998) and Cuff (2000). 
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Hence, mandatory activation programs affect both welfare participants and non-partici-
pants through exit and entry effects, respectively. However, most previous research has 
focused solely on their effects on welfare participants and thus has captured only their 
effect on welfare exits. Grogger, Haider, and Klerman (2003) show, using both obser-
vational data and simulations, that welfare exits accounted for around half of the large 
reduction in US welfare use during the 1990s, while the other half is explained by re-
duced entry rates. It is thus clear that by not studying the possible welfare entrants, a 
large share of the dynamics is lost. The importance of entry rates is also established in 
Hansen and Lofstrom (2006), where it is shown that entry rates explain a large part of 
the difference in welfare participation between native Swedes and immigrants. 
Although they have been shown to be important, the effects of activation policies on 
entry rates have not been thoroughly studied. To our knowledge, the only study where 
an attempt to study entry into welfare is made is that by Dahlberg, Johansson, and Mörk 
(2008). Their study uses the differences in the timing of implementation of activation 
requirements in the different city districts of Stockholm to identify their effect on wel-
fare caseloads. Their study captures both the entry and exit effects because the data con-
sist of information on the whole population rather than only welfare recipients. How-
ever, they are not able to distinguish between the two, and thus the dynamics are still 
largely unknown. 
In this study, we aim to examine these dynamics more closely and study the effects 
of mandatory activation on welfare entry and welfare exit separately. The identifying 
variation that we use, which is the same as that used by Dahlberg, Johansson, and Mörk 
(2008), is the time differences in implementation of mandatory activation for unem-
ployed welfare participants in different city districts of Stockholm. By using individual-
level panel data, we can use this variation to compare entry and exit rates across city 
districts with different requirements at different time periods. The advantage of looking 
only at the city districts of Stockholm is that they have the same political composition 
and, most importantly, belong to the same labor market region. It is thus possible to 
control for (unobserved) common macroeconomic shocks. 
4  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants When studying the effect of mandatory activation on entry and exit rates, one may 
worry that relocation of welfare-prone individuals might invalidate the exogenous vari-
ation. Several recent studies confirm the hypothesis that regions with generous welfare 
systems attract welfare participants; that is, welfare-prone individuals relocate to places 
where social assistance is higher (Meyer 2000, Gelbach 2004, McKinnish 2007 and 
Fiva 2009). However, in most cases, welfare migration is small in magnitude. A study 
by Edmark (2009) shows no indication that the activation requirements implemented in 
Stockholm affected migration patterns. Thus, we do not think that migration of welfare-
prone individuals will bias the results of this study. 
In general, the Swedish experience of welfare reforms makes a valuable contribution 
to the existing literature because Sweden is considered to have a relatively generous 
welfare system. For example, in Sweden, all individuals can be eligible to receive wel-
fare benefits, whereas in the US, support is primarily aimed at single mothers. The 
Swedish system makes it possible to look at heterogeneous treatment effects across dif-
ferent demographic groups. Also, the Swedish reform provides credible identifying 
variation because it has not been combined with other instruments such as time limits 
and tax subsidies, as is often the case in the US. 
In this study, we find that mandatory activation has no effect on the entry rates when 
studying the whole population, but exit rates increase by 0.9 percentage points. When 
we restrict our sample to estimate the effect on individuals that can be assumed to have 
a larger risk of entering welfare dependency, we find that the activation programs lead 
to a significant reduction in entry rates for this group. In addition, for young individuals 
(aged 18-25), there are large effects on entry rates, and there are larger effects on exit 
rates for unmarried individuals without children compared to the whole population. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss previous literature. 
Section 3 presents institutional settings in Sweden and the data used in this study. The 
empirical strategy is described in section 4. We begin section 5 by presenting the effects 
on the welfare caseload before we present the results from both our main specification 
(5.2) and also from placebo estimations (5.3). We then discuss the results of estimations 
in which we allow for time-varying effects (5.4) and, at last, results for different sub-
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and discuss our results. 
2 Previous  literature 
The major change in the American welfare system during the 1990s created a huge body 
of economic research evaluating the effects of these reforms. Even before the major 
reform in 1996, when the US changed from Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), many states had waivers 
from the AFDC rules. The proposed waiver programs had to be evaluated by the state 
after implementation. Because many of these waivers allowed states to enforce work re-
quirements for welfare recipients, there are many studies in which the effects of activa-
tion requirements on welfare participants are investigated (see, for example, Gueron and 
Pauly (1991) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995)). Nevertheless, there are very few 
studies in which the effects of such changes on both welfare participants and non-par-
ticipants are analyzed. Instead, most previous work has consisted of experimental stu-
dies or leavers' studies and therefore by construction has focused on exit effects and du-
ration of welfare participation. The results reported by these studies are mixed (see, for 
example, Blank (2002) for an overview). 
Since the changes in the US welfare system, the caseload has decreased substantially. 
However, this cannot be attributed only to the welfare reforms because the US also ex-
perienced strong economic growth during the same time period. Klerman and Haider 
(2004) show that it is important to look at how entry and exit rates are affected by wel-
fare programs together with economic conditions because both determine the total ca-
seload. They find that 50 percent of the decline in caseload in California can be attri-
buted to the decline in the unemployment rate. It is therefore very important to take 
changes in economic conditions into consideration when estimating the effects of wel-
fare programs. 
Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) argue that activation programs in the US can be 
divided into three groups. The first consists of programs founded on the belief that the 
individual's employability is improved mostly by working, even at low-paying jobs. 
6  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants Thus, these programs focus on employment, and if the individual is not successful in 
finding a job, he or she may be offered some training. The second group of programs 
focuses on education, and most applicants first take part in classroom education to in-
crease their skill level before beginning to apply for jobs. In the third group, the initia-
tives are mixed: some individuals are assigned to training and others to job search ac-
tivities. These mixed initiatives programs have proven to be the most effective of the 
three types. 
A related literature investigates the relation between the duration of unemployment 
and the generosity of the unemployment insurance system. For example, Black et al. 
(2003) show that the threat of required training (rather than the program as such) sig-
nificantly reduces the duration of unemployment spells. This implies that activation 
policies have a stronger effect on the individuals' incentives rather than their employa-
bility. If the activation programs for social assistance recipients in Stockholm are a 
greater deterrent to those who can find other means of support and provide less help to 
those who want to leave welfare dependence, we will find larger effects on the entry 
rates than on the exit rates. 
Dahl (2003) evaluates a workfare program in Norway in 1995. He finds that welfare 
recipients who were allocated to the program were farther from the labor market than a 
comparison group, but he does not find any treatment effect of the program. 
There are only a few studies that use Swedish data to investigate the effect of activa-
tion requirements on welfare participation. In a study by Milton and Bergström (1998), 
an activation program in the municipality of Uppsala is studied. In this program, some 
welfare participants were required to apply for jobs full time and report the number of 
applications to a caseworker. The authors find no effect of this program on the number 
of people on welfare or on the probability of becoming employed. Largely similar re-
sults are found in Giertz (2004), which analyzes an activation program in Malmö. How-
ever, it is uncertain if there were any sanctions for those recipients in Malmö who did 
not attend the activation program. Jönsson (2007) finds that activation requirements in 
Swedish municipalities significantly reduce participation rates. However, she does not 
find a significant effect on the cost of welfare. The previously mentioned study by 
Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008) finds that the activation requirements in Stock-
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non-Western countries. They also find a positive effect of activation requirements on 
employment. 
Hansen and Lofstrom have also used Swedish data to look at welfare participation. 
Their main focus has been on differences between native-born Swedes and immigrants. 
They find that the differences between natives and immigrants are mainly due to differ-
ences in entry rates (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003) and that immigrants’ participation in 
welfare decreases with time spent in Sweden, even though immigrants have higher par-
ticipation rates than natives even after 20 years in Sweden (Hansen and Lofstrom 2006). 
3  Institutional setting and data 
3.1  Social assistance in Sweden 
Sweden is divided into 290 municipalities, which are responsible for the majority of the 
publicly provided welfare services, such as childcare, education and elder care. The lo-
cal governments have historically also been responsible for relief for the poor, whereas 
labor market policies have been administered by the central government. Although so-
cial assistance is largely a local responsibility, there is national legislation establishing 
the main principles for benefits. The legal framework is stated in the Social Services 
Act passed in 1982. This law ensures all Swedish citizens and foreign citizens living in 
Sweden financial support to maintain a “reasonable” standard of living in default of 
other means of support. A minimum benefit level is stated in the legal framework, but 
the exact level of the benefit is decided by each municipality. Social assistance is a 
means tested benefit, implying that all other financial resources (such as savings and 
valuable assets) must be exhausted before an individual is eligible for benefits. This 
benefit is a last resort when social insurance, such as unemployment insurance and 
health insurance, is not available or is insufficient. Unlike the social insurances, social 
assistance is not income based. However, eligibility is universal in the sense that it is 
not dependent on, for example, having children, as is the case in some other countries 
(for example, the US and the UK). 
8  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants During the recession in the 1990s, the social assistance caseload grew, and many muni-
cipalities faced difficulties in financing the social assistance system. As shown in 
Figure 1, both the cost of welfare benefits and the number of households receiving wel-
fare increased until the mid-1990s, but they have since decreased. However, the cost of 
benefits per household has increased substantially. In 1983, the average benefit received 
among those on social assistance was around 9,000 SEK (around EUR 940) per year 
and household. In 2008, this figure was almost 44,000 SEK (EUR 4600). This implies 
that individuals who were on welfare in 2008 received benefits for more months during 
a year and/or larger amounts of benefits than was the case in 1983. 
Year
2010 2000 1990 1980
 
Cost of welfare, millions of SEK








Figure 1 Cost of welfare (millions of SEK) and number of welfare households (100s), 
1983–2008.  
Source: Statistics Sweden.  
In response to the financial difficulties and increase in unemployed social assistance 
beneficiaries during the recession, many local governments started to develop municipal 
activation programs to try to move social assistance recipients from welfare to self-suf-
ficiency. In 1998, the Social Services Act was changed to explicitly allow municipali-
ties to require welfare participants to take part in activation programs to retain their eli-
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gibility
3. The activation programs in the Swedish municipalities consist of job-search 
programs and education as well as practice at job sites. In some cases, rehabilitation 
programs are also offered (Salonen and Ulmestig 2004). 
3.2  The city districts of Stockholm 
In Stockholm, the responsibility for many municipal services is decentralized to city 
districts’ councils. During the time period relevant to this study, there were 18 city dis-
tricts within the municipality. City districts are not responsible for collecting taxes and 
in general follow guidelines given by the Municipal Council. There are no elections at 
the city district level, and hence, the political representation is equivalent at the district 
and municipal levels. 
In Table 1, some characteristics of the city districts used in this study for 1993 are 
shown. The second column is mean social assistance including all individuals in the 
districts, that is, even those who do not receive social assistance. As can be seen, this 
varies between around 1,000 SEK for Bromma and 5,800 SEK for Rinkeby. However, 
for those actually receiving social assistance, the mean only varies between 15,400 SEK 
and 19,100 SEK (see fifth column). The city district that is most different from the oth-
ers is Rinkeby, with the lowest mean disposable income and high shares of social assis-
tance receivers, immigrants and low-educated individuals, highest social assistance en-
try rates and lowest exit rates. 
 
3 Some municipalities implemented activation programs prior to 1998.  
Table 1 City district characteristics, 1993 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
























Rinkeby 0.308  5,785  96,052  0.463 18,771  0.115  0.229  1998 
Skärholmen 0.111  1,713  124,328  0.124 15,387  0.048  0.319  1999 
Farsta 0.115  2,181  128,714  0.048 18,918  0.047  0.302  2001 
Kista 0.171  3,189  126,035  0.226 18,602  0.073  0.279  2001 
Älvsjö 0.067  885  145,118  0.032 13,175  0.033  0.340  2002 
Hägersten 0.072  1,380  134,266  0.032 19,080  0.032  0.349  2003 
Liljeholmen 0.095  1,744  126,067  0.039 18,303  0.042  0.325  2003 
Spånga-Tensta 0.149  2,555  131,017 0.214  17,131  0.058  0.289  2003 
Bromma 0.058  998  154,035  0.025 17,217  0.026  0.352  2004 
Enskede-Årsta 0.075  1,318  133,375 0.043  17,686  0.030  0.363  2004 
Hässelby-Vällingby 0.071  1,140  141,590 0.048  16,043  0.032  0.342  2004 
Vantör 0.122  2,219  124,368  0.067 18,152  0.048  0.298  2004 
Total 0.102  1,798  133,960  0.085 17,594  0.042  0.310  2003 
a Average welfare benefits in the city district, including its entire population. 
b For the year 1995 as data are only available for the years 1995-2005. 
c Average welfare benefits among welfare recipients. 
 
 Of the social assistance recipients in Stockholm in 2005, around three quarters were un-
employed. A large fraction of these, 77 percent, are unemployed and do not meet the 
eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance; that is, they do not have labor market 
experience and/or are not members of an unemployment benefit fund. However, they 
are registered at the employment office and are looking for and willing to accept a job 
(USK 2007). 
Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008), using results from questionnaires and inter-
views conducted by Karin Edmark and Kajsa Hanspers, determine when activation re-
quirements were implemented in the different city districts. For an activation program to 
be classified as mandatory, the activity must be directed to all unemployed welfare par-
ticipants and require the individuals to attend the activity center for at least a few hours 
every week. It was possible to determine a starting year for 12 of the 18 city districts. In 
the five most centrally located districts and Skarpnäck, it was not possible to determine 
when activation programs were implemented. For the central districts, this is mainly due 
to the fact that there are very few welfare participants in this area. A shortcoming of the 
information on the implementation year is that we do not know when during the year 
the activation program was implemented. According to the classification, the first city 
districts to implement activation requirements were Rinkeby (in 1998) and Skärholmen 
(in 1999). Eventually, other city districts followed, and by the end of the studied time 
period, all districts where classification was possible had implemented mandatory acti-
vation. The last column of Table 1 shows the launching year for activation requirements 
in each city district. 
The activation programs created new Jobcentres that social assistance recipients are 
required to attend for at least a few hours each week. Previously, welfare recipients 
were only in contact with the local social worker, and there were no mandatory pro-
grams for all social assistance recipients. Unemployed recipients were directed to the 
unemployment office, but there were no sanctions if they did not participate in any ac-
tivities. The activation program in Skärholmen is the most renowned program, usually 
referred to as “the Skärholmen model”. It started as a measure to reduce welfare partici-
pation among students who were unemployed during the summer. In 1999, the program 
was widened to include all unemployed welfare participants. The main feature of the 
12  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants program is that unemployed welfare applicants are sent to the Jobcentre. In order to re-
tain eligibility for welfare, the applicant must visit the Jobcentre for three hours every 
day, following a rotating schedule to prevent black market work, until he or she finds a 
job. The required activity consists mostly of individual job searching. The Jobcentre 
provides computers with internet access and assistance from staff when necessary. As 
noted by Thorén (2005), the resources are often limited; for example, clients can rarely 
use the computers for more than 15 minutes each day. There is daily registration of par-
ticipants’ attendance, and because there is close cooperation between social workers and 
Jobcentre staff, absence is easily detected and can (and often does) lead to a reduction in 
benefits. This possibility of imposing sanctions is common to programs in all city dis-
tricts. The main goal of the activation programs is to improve individuals’ chances of 
becoming self-supportive. However, Thorén (2005) concludes that many of the activi-
ties primarily aim at testing the client's willingness to work. 
The information about the starting year of activation programs is combined with in-
dividual-level register data from the LOUISE database administered by Statistics Swe-
den. This database includes information on various individual characteristics such as 
age, country of birth, number of children, education, etc. for all individuals aged 16–64 
living in Sweden
4. It also contains the share of the household’s social assistance that the 
individual has received during the past year as well as benefits collected from other 
parts of the social security system. Social assistance is directed at households rather 
than individuals, and we define an individual as a welfare participant if he or she is liv-
ing in a household that received social assistance sometime during a given year. This is 
a very rough but commonly used classification. What we refer to as social assistance is 
thus the individual’s share of the household’s total received benefit. Because all newly 
arrived immigrants are eligible for social assistance during their first 18 months in Swe-
den (introduktionsbidrag) under different eligibility criteria than other welfare partici-
pants, these individuals are excluded for three years to avoid capturing their dynamics 
due to this sort of support. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the population. The 
mean amount of welfare benefit received by an individual is slightly above 2,000 SEK 
                                                 
4 Individuals aged 16 and 17 are excluded from our sample. 
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amount of benefits among those who actually receive any benefits at all is around 
23,600 SEK per year. 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
  Mean Std.  dev. 
Social assistance (100' SEK)  20.667  99.936 
Share with social assistance  0.087  0.283 
Income (100' SEK)*  1,663  2,680 
Age 40.525  12.151 
Age<26 0.125  0.330 
Female 0.499  0.500 
Immigrant 0.223  0.416 
Native 0.702  0.458 
Born in western country  0.098  0.298 
Born in non-Western country  0.125  0.331 
No of children  0.657  0.995 
Parent 0.372  0.483 
Single parent  0.063  0.244 
Compulsory schooling or less  0.195  0.396 
Post-secondary schooling  0.350  0.477 
N  2,986,175  
*The income variable is only available for individuals from the year 1995. 
 
We define entry into welfare as being on welfare in year t but not in year t-1. The 
share of welfare entrants is the fraction of the whole population not receiving welfare 
the previous year that enters into welfare in a given year. If possible, it would be pre-
ferred (and more precise) to define the share of entrants as the fraction entering relative 
to the population at risk of entering. However, it is difficult to assess this population be-
cause eligibility for social assistance is not based on income (or other variables that we 
can observe) alone but also on financial assets and various household characteristics. 
We will, however, make an attempt to do this; see section 3.3. 
Welfare exit is defined as receiving welfare support in year t-1 but not in year t. In 
this case, the studied population is more easily defined and consists of all individuals 
receiving welfare in year t-1. An individual is exposed to treatment if he or she is living 
in a city district where mandatory activation has been implemented. It is important to 
note that the exit population will change over time due to the reform because individu-
als closest to the labor market may never enter the population of social assistance reci-
pients due to the introduction of mandatory work requirements. This may call the as-
14  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants sumption for difference-in-differences into question (see section 4
5). What can be done 
is to see if there are different effects of the reform between the year in which activation 
was implemented and the following year. It can be expected that the exit effects de-
crease over time because the individual closest to the labor market never enters, and 
therefore, the remaining population of individuals on social assistance have a harder 
time finding other means of support. 
Figure 2 presents the average entry and exit rates by year for the studied population 
together with the unemployment rate in the municipality of Stockholm. We can see that 
entry and exit rates follow the unemployment rate, with high entry rates and low exit 
rates during the first half of the time period. Entry rates decreased and exit rates in-
creased with the economic recovery until 2003. This is in line with the development of 





























































Figure 2 Unemployment rate, raw entry and exit rates by year in Stockholm 
                                                 
5 This is also a problem, albeit probably a smaller one, in the entry sample. 
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same labor market region and therefore meet the same economic conditions, but live in 
areas where mandatory activation was implemented at different times. Including time 
dummies will therefore hopefully capture the common economic conditions in Stock-
holm. 
3.3 Social  assistance  in different groups 
It is clear that the probability of becoming dependent on social assistance is not un-
iformly distributed over different demographic groups and across the income distribu-
tion. Among the more welfare-prone groups are young individuals, immigrants born in 
non-Western countries, single parents and people with little education. Because these 
groups have a higher probability of receiving benefits than others, we attempt to create a 
better-defined entry sample by estimating effects on entry rates using only a subpopula-
tion consisting of individuals with any of these characteristics. Thus, we reduce the 
problem of estimating an effect for individuals that have close to zero probability of 
ever participating in welfare (for example, individuals with high education and income 
are unlikely to change their behavior in response to a reform that will probably never af-
fect them). We prefer to define the population at risk of entering into welfare using de-
mographic characteristics rather than income. It is likely that individuals with low in-
come are more likely to receive welfare benefits than others. However, Meyer (2000) 
argues that restricting the sample to include only low-income individuals might create 
bias because poverty is likely to be higher in an area with low benefit levels and vice 
versa, which might affect welfare participation as well as entry and exit. 
We are also interested in how activation requirements affect more specific subgroups 
in the population. As shown by Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008), the activation 
programs that we study have a larger caseload effect for young individuals and immi-
grants born in non-Western countries. Thus, we look at the entry and exit effects for 
these groups separately. Young individuals are likely to be more mobile than others, and 
we therefore expect them to experience larger effects of activation requirements. Young 
people may also have more opportunities to begin an educational program or receive fi-
nancial help from their families. Another mobile group is unmarried individuals without 
children, and thus we are also interested in the reform effect on this group. 
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over the whole time period. This shows that young individuals have both higher entry 
rates and higher exit rates, which indicates mobility. Immigrants, especially those born 
in a non-Western country, have high entry rates and low exit rates. The high entry rates 
are in line with Hansen and Lofstrom (2006). The same pattern observed for immigrants 
can be observed among single mothers. 
Table 3 Raw and exit rates by subpopulations 
 Entry  Exit 
All 0.026  0.335 
Women 0.025  0.337 
Men 0.026  0.334 
Age < 26  0.051  0.351 
Immigrant 0.050  0.288 
Born in non-Western country  0.070  0.275 
Single mother  0.070  0.277 
Single without children  0.028  0.352 
 
4 Empirical  strategy 
To determine the treatment effect on the treated (TT) when mandatory activation is in-
troduced, we use a difference-in-differences (DD) approach in a linear probability 
model (LPM). When estimating the effects on entry and exit rates, there will be differ-
ent events of interest. In the entry case, the population used is those individuals who did 
not receive any social assistance at t-1, and the event of interest will be if they then re-
ceive social assistance at t. Let Wit=1 indicate that the individual received welfare at 
time t; then, the probability of entry is given by P(Wit=1|Wit-1=0). When we estimate the 
effect on exit rates, the population is comprised of those individuals receiving social as-
sistance at t-1, and the event of interest is if they do not receive social assistance at t, 
P(Wit=0|Wit-1=1). 
Let YDti=1 if the event of interest occurs with treatment D at time t for individual i. If 
there is mandatory activation, D=1. Also let t-1 be before activation is implemented in 
the treatment district and t be after. Then, the identifying assumption for the DD esti-
mator to recover the TT is 
  00 - 1 00 - 1 [- |, 1 ] [- |, 0 ]   ti t i i i ti t i i i EY Y X D EY Y X D = ==  (1) 
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trol group if no treatment had occurred. Thus, implementation of activation require-
ments cannot be related to (unobserved) city district-specific conditions. As mentioned 
earlier, this assumption can be questionable, especially in the exit sample, because the 
composition of this sample is affected by the reform if fewer individuals enter welfare 
due to the reform. 
In the difference-in-differences approach in the LPM, we include city districts and 
year dummies. By doing this rather than only including dummies for treatment and 
control groups, we are able to control for time-constant unobserved city district-specific 
effects and systematic changes over time that are common for all city districts. If an in-
dividual lives in city district j, where there are mandatory work requirements at time t, 
the treatment variable Djt=1; otherwise, Djt=0. If the probability for the event of interest 
(entry or exit) to occur is given by p(entry/exit)=Yijt, then 
  jt t i j t W ijt jt j ijt YD t r e n d α τβ γ η =++ + + + (2) 
where  j α  and  t τ  are city district and year dummies, respectively. β  measures the ef-
fect of mandatory activation on the probability of entry and exit. To control for individ-
ual heterogeneity that varies over time,  ijt W  is included
6.  j trend  are linear city dis-
trict-specific time trends, and  ijt η  is an error term. 
To see if the results are very dependent on specification, we perform the estimations 
in three steps, where the first step is with constant parameter estimates (γ ) for the 
individual characteristics. We then add time trends in the second estimation, and in the 
third estimation we allow for even more flexibility using time trends and time-interacted 
covariates (giving  t γ ). This last step is done because individual characteristics may 
differently influence the probabilities of moving into and out of social assistance de-
pending on the business cycle. 
                                                 
6 The individual characteristics we include in the model are age, age squared, dummy variables for female, parent, 
single parent, born in a Western country except Sweden, born in a non-Western country, low educated (compulsory 
schooling or less) and high educated (at least some post-secondary schooling). 
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tory activation was introduced and the following year, we will also see if the effects dif-
fer at t (when mandatory activation is introduced), t+1 and   (see section  2 t ≥+ 5.4). 
4.1  Standard error corrections 
The model proposed by equation 2 does not consider the possibility of city district-spe-
cific shocks. If such shocks exist and are correlated with the timing of the reform, the 
effect of the shock will be captured in our estimates of the reform effect. An additional 
problem with these kinds of shocks is that they may cause the standard errors to be cor-
related among individuals living in the same city district. If this is the case, the standard 
errors may be dramatically downward biased, and thus the inference is not valid. How-
ever, because this study only concerns a relatively small geographical region with one 
common labor market, we argue that we are able to capture such shocks with our most 
flexible specification. 
The standard errors may, though, still be correlated within groups because observa-
tions are not necessarily independent within districts. One way to control for this corre-
lation is to estimate treatment effects on group averages. This would be a simple solu-
tion, but it implies that we cannot make use of the microcovariates and would cause a 
large loss of information. Instead, we test for whether observations are correlated fol-
lowing Wooldridge (2003). He proposes a two-stage procedure where an efficient 
minimum distance (MD) estimator is obtained in the first step by estimating 
  ti j t W ijt jt ijt Yqγ ε = ++  (3) 
where the predicted city district and time specific effects,  ˆjt q , and their estimated stan-
dard errors,  ˆ jt σ , are saved. The predicted  ˆjt q  are then used to estimate the following 
equation: 
  ˆ jt jtj t qD t r e n d j j t α τβ μ =++ + + (4) 
with weighted least squares where the weights are given by  ˆ 1/ jt σ . Under the null of no 
unobserved city district-specific shocks, we have that (in the second-stage estimation) 
where S is equal to 
2 ~(
a
SSR S K χ − ) JT ×  and K  is equal to the number of parame-
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shocks exist, and Wooldridge (2003) argues that a consistent estimator can be found 
using the two-stage procedure proposed by Donald and Lang (2007). They argue that it 
is possible to correct for group- and time-specific shocks as well as controlling for serial 
correlation in the error term by estimating group averages while still using the informa-
tion in the microcovariates. In practice, this is equivalent to estimating equations 3 and 
4 using the group sizes, that is, the share of the total sample population living in each 
specific city district every year, as weights in equation 4 instead of the variance of  ˆjt q  
from equation 3. This between estimator gives the correct standard errors and t-statistics 
and thus provides a valid inference. However, if there is no correlation in standard er-
rors within clusters, this approach reduces the amount of available information more 
than necessary. Therefore, we only use group averages when the Wooldridge test rejects 
the null of independent observations. 
5 Results 
In the following, we present the results of our estimations. We start by estimating casel-
oad effects for our sample before we evaluate if there are any effects on entry and exit 
for the whole population. In section 5.3, we conduct some sensitivity analyses by per-
forming a placebo test, and in section 5.4, we determine whether there are varying ef-
fects over time. Finally, we see if there are heterogeneous effects for different groups in 
section 5.5. 
5.1 Effects  on  caseloads 
According to Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008), the caseload (share of welfare re-
cipients) was reduced by 0.5 percentage points in Stockholm due to mandatory activa-
tion requirements. However, their study uses a different sample as they do not include 
Rinkeby and use data only up to the year 2003. Therefore, for comparison of our main 
entry and exit results, we run estimations of caseloads with our complete sample using 
equation 2 and for different subpopulations. The caseload results are shown in Table 4. 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (3) 









 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Time-varying controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Linear trend   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,986,175  372,325  372,917 1,395,995 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In our estimation, we find a smaller reduction in welfare participation due to the 
reform, 0.3 percent, than Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008) found. There are, how-
ever, heterogeneous effects, and the effect is much larger for both young individuals and 
unmarried individuals without children (1.2 and 0.6 percent, respectively). 
Surprisingly, we find a significant increase in caseload due to the reform for immi-
grants from non-Western countries, whereas Dahlberg, Johansson and Mörk (2008) 
found large negative effects. There are four differences between our sample and theirs. 
We include Rinkeby, have two additional years of data and define immigrants from 
non-Western countries in a slightly different way - they do not include immigrants from 
Eastern Europe as we do. Furthermore, in our sample, immigrants are not included 
during their first three years in Sweden, compared to two in Dahlberg et al.'s study, be-
cause we do not want to capture any dynamics due to the social assistance newly arrived 
immigrants receive. If we exclude Rinkeby, we get a negative point estimate (-0.002), 
but it is far from significantly different from zero. 
5.2 Baseline  estimation 
The baseline estimations show the results from estimations of equation 2 and the test 
statistics from the two-step Wooldridge approach given by equations 3 and 4. In the 
tables, column 1 shows results from the least flexible specification, where we neither 
include trends nor let the impact of covariates vary over time. In column 2, we add li-
near, city district-specific trends, and in column 3, we also add time-interacted cova-
riates. In column 4, we present the Donald and Lang estimates, if the null from the 
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approach (that is, including trends and time-interacted covariates). 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the results for the estimates of the probability of entry and 
exit, respectively. Looking at the Wooldridge test statistics, we see that for the entry es-
timates, we reject the null of no correlation in standard errors for all specifications (the 
null is rejected at the 5 percent level if the test statistic is greater than 132 with 107 de-
grees of freedom). For the exit rates, we do not reject the null in the last specification, 
and thus we do not present a Donald-Lang estimate in this case. 
Table 5 Estimation results: entry 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Controls   Yes  Yes  No  No 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes  No 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,698,222  2,698,222 2,698,222  156 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 6 Estimation results: exit 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Controls   Yes  Yes  No 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 287,953  287,953  287,953 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The estimates for the effect on entry vary from a reduction by 0.5 percentage points 
in the least flexible estimation to an insignificant reduction by 0.1 percentage points in 
the Donald and Lang estimation. To be able to capture true reform effects, it therefore 
seems important to control for time trends in the city districts and to allow the effects of 
the covariates to vary over time. The conclusion is that we do not see any effect on the 
entry rates for the whole population when mandatory activation is implemented. The 
reform may, however, still have had an effect on the entry rates at different times since 
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risk of entering welfare (see section 5.4 and section 5.5). 
Also, the point estimates for the exit rates vary by specification and become smaller 
with increasing flexibility of the strategy used. The probability of exit is increased due 
to the implementation of activation requirements, but these estimates are relatively 
small in the last specification (the exit rates are around 33.5 percent on average - see 
Figure 2 - which implies that the number of exits increases by around 200 individuals 
each year as a result of the reform). 
Table 19, Table 20 and Table 21 in the Appendix present further estimation results, 
including parameter estimates for covariates
7 as well as district and year dummies. 
5.3 Placebo  estimations 
In order to verify that the effects estimated above are truly reform effects, we performed 
a placebo experiment using data from 1993 to 2000. For the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, 
we exclude Rinkeby, and for 1999 and 2000, we also exclude Skärholmen. Thus, we 
only use data from before the reform was implemented in any of the city districts. We 
move the launching year of the actual reform five years back in time. If the estimation 
of this “pseudo”-reform were to yield significant results, it would indicate the possibil-
ity that the estimates above do not represent an effect of the reform but rather of some 
city district-specific characteristic. 
The columns in Table 7 and Table 8 shows equivalent estimations as in the previous 
tables: column 1 shows the results from the least flexible specification, linear trends are 
added in column 2, and in column 3, we also time-interact the control variables. The 
Wooldridge test statistic does not reject the null of no correlation in the standard errors 
in the third specification, but we still present the Donald and Lang estimates in column 
4 of Table 7 for comparison because we use the Donald and Lang estimator in the base-
line estimation of effects on entry rates. 
  
                                                 
7 Due to limited space, we only show parameter estimates from the second specification, where the covariates are not 
interacted with time. More detailed results are available upon request. 
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Table 7 Results from placebo estimations: entry 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mandatory activation implemented  0.001  0.002
** 0.001
* 0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes  No 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1,530,957  1,530,957 1,530,957  91 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 8 Results from placebo estimations: exit 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  0.001  0.001  0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 188,904  188,904  188,904 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In the placebo estimations for entry, the results are significantly different from zero 
in two of the specifications. The estimates are positive, however, so if city district cha-
racteristics are driving the results in some way, they seem to reduce rather than inflate 
the real estimations. 
In the estimations of how the “pseudo”-reform affected exit, none of the results are 
significantly different from zero, which strengthens the argument that the results from 
the baseline estimations are real effects of the implementation of mandatory activation. 
5.4  Time-changing treatment effects 
Even if we do not find any effects on entry rates due to the reform or any large effects 
on exit rates, there may be varying effects over time. To see whether the estimated 
treatment effects are increasing or decreasing with time elapsed since the reform, we 
change the specification given by equation 2 slightly and estimate separate treatment ef-
fects for the year of implementation, the first year after implementation and two or more 
years after implementation. The results are given in Table 9 and Table 10 (for more esti-
mation results, see Table 22 and Table 23 in the Appendix). 
 
24  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants Table 9 Results from estimations with time-specific treatment: entry 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Year of implementation  -0.003
*** -0.001
** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 




 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Two or more years after   -0.009
*** -0.001 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes  No 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,698,222  2,698,222 2,698,222  156 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 10 Results from estimations with time-specific treatment: exit 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
One year after  0.018
*** 0.014
** 0.009 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 




 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 287,953  287,953  287,953 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In the entry estimation, the effects are still insignificant in the Donald-Lang estima-
tion. The exit estimations do not show a clear pattern of effects over the time periods. If 
anything, the effect seems to increase over time. However, the estimates for the differ-
ent time periods are not statistically different from each other in the third column. Over-
all, there seems to be a phase-in of the reform during the reform year but no large varia-
tion in treatment effects after the first year. 
As mentioned earlier, the assumption for difference-in-differences can be called into 
question, especially for the exit sample, if entry rates are affected by the reform. Be-
cause there does not seem to be any effect of mandatory activation on entry rates in the 
year of implementation, we estimate exit rates but restrict the sample to include each 
city district only in the year that activation was introduced and the year after. The results 
obtained using this sample are shown in Table 11. As can be seen, the point estimates in 
the last specification are somewhat higher, but because the standard error also increases, 
the estimate is no longer significant at the five percent level. 
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 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  0.019
*** 0.013
* 0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 264,802  264,802  264,802 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
5.5 Heterogeneous  effects 
5.5.1  Population at risk 
As mentioned in section 3.3, certain groups of individuals
8 are more likely to be on wel-
fare. Therefore, we estimated the effect of mandatory activation on entry rates sepa-
rately for this population. We have thus excluded many individuals who are never at 
risk of entering welfare. The results are shown in Table 12. Here, the Wooldridge test is 
not rejected in the most flexible specification. The results indicate a reduction in entry 
rates of 0.3 percentage points for this population. The program therefore seems to have 
had an effect on entry rates for those individuals at greater risk of entering welfare. 
Table 12 Results for population at risk: entry 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 839,078  839,078  839,078 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
5.5.2  Effects on subpopulations 
To study whether activation requirements affect subgroups of the population differently, 
we performed separate estimations for some of these groups
9. Because Dahlberg, 
Johansson and Mörk (2008) find large effects of mandatory activation on young indi-
                                                 
8 These groups are young individuals, immigrants born in non-Western countries, single parents and individuals with 
low education. 
9 We also performed estimations for single mothers, who constitute another vulnerable group, but no effect of the 
implementation of mandatory activation could be found on either entry or exit rates for this group. 
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and exit effects for these groups. 
Results for individuals under the age of 26 are presented in Table 13 and Table 14. 
The effect on the probability of entry is reduced by 0.6 percentage points in the last spe-
cification. This is a rather large effect as the mean entry rate for this group during the 
studied period was about 5 percent (see Table 3). For young individuals, the exit effect 
is insignificant. 
Table 13 Estimation results: entry, age<26 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 312,850  312,850  312,850 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 14 Estimation results: exit, age <26 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  0.023
** 0.013 0.014 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 59,475  59,475  59,475 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The results for immigrants born in a non-Western country are presented in Table 15 
and Table 16. Neither the entry nor the exit effect is significant. Although Dahlberg, Jo-
hansson and Mörk (2008) found large effects on caseload for this group, the results here 
are not surprising as we find no effect on caseload for this group in our sample. 
Table 15 Estimation results: entry, immigrants born in non-western countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 260,084  260,084  260,084 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 16 Estimation results: exit, immigrants born in non-western countries 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  0.002  -0.004  0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 112,833  112,833  112,833 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
We also present results from separate estimations for unmarried individuals without 
children as this group could be expected to be very mobile and is not always eligible for 
welfare in other countries. As seen in Table 17 and Table 18, mandatory activation poli-
cies do not affect the entry rate for this group but lead to a significant increase in exit 
rate that is larger than the population average (2 percentage points, compared with an 
average exit rate of 35 percent for this group). 
Table 17 Estimation results: entry, unmarried without children 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Mandatory activation implemented  -0.005
*** -0.003
*** -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1,249,097  1,249,097 1,249,097 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 18 Estimation results: exit, unmarried without children 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 146,898  146,898  146,898 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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In this paper, we have examined the dynamic effects of introducing mandatory activa-
tion of welfare recipients. Earlier literature has found that welfare participation de-
creases when mandatory activation is implemented, but in most cases, the researchers 
have only included those individuals who already are welfare participants and therefore 
have only captured exit effects. In studies where the effect on the total population has 
been analyzed, the dynamics are still unclear as the entry and exit effects are not consi-
dered separately. 
According to theory, activation requirements will have effects both in the short run, 
when those who can support themselves by other means will leave welfare, and in the 
long run, when people will make decisions earlier in life to decrease their probability of 
ending up on welfare later. In our study, we are not able to distinguish between the short 
and the long run, but due to the relatively short time period being studied, the effects 
that we capture are mostly short-run effects. 
To analyze the dynamics when mandatory activation is implemented, we use register 
data on the whole population in the municipality of Stockholm between 1993 and 2005. 
The municipality of Stockholm is divided into city districts where mandatory activation 
was implemented at different times between 1998 and 2004. We use this heterogeneity 
to evaluate the effects of activation requirements on entry and exit rates in a difference-
in-differences model. 
Our results indicate that entry rates decrease as a result of mandatory activation, but 
these results are not robust to specification changes when studying the whole popula-
tion. However, when estimating the effect for a more welfare-prone group
10, the entry 
rate decreases by 0.3 percentage points. The effects on exit rates are positive, indicating 
that the reform increases the likelihood that current welfare participants will find em-
ployment or leave social assistance for some other reason, but the effects are small. 
Thus, our results give some support for the hypothesis of a “threat” effect presented in 
Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003). 
                                                 
10 This group consists of young individuals, immigrants born in non-Western countries, single parents and people 
with little education. 
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only using data for the time period before activation requirements were implemented in 
any city district. In the estimation of entry rates, the estimates are small and positive. 
Changes in exit rates are close to zero and insignificant, which strengthens the results 
from the main estimations. 
Moreover, we check whether the effects arise immediately after the reform or if there 
is a phase-in period. The results do not give any clear indications of how the effect 
changes over time. Because the aggregated effects are rather small and unstable, this 
finding is not surprising. In the exit case, there seems to be a very small effect during 
the year of implementation of the reform, but that effect grows over time. This may be 
explained by the fact that we do not know at what time during the year the reform was 
implemented. This means that in some districts the reform may have been carried out at 
the end of the year, and thus, it is likely that the effect of the reform would not be ob-
servable until the following year. 
To see if the results differ for different subgroups within the population, we also per-
form estimations for some subpopulations for which the existing literature has found 
larger effects. The first group consisted of young people under the age of 26. For this 
group, we find a significant reduction in entry due to the reform, but no exit effects 
could be found. The second subpopulation is immigrants from non-Western countries, 
and for this group, we find no effect on either entry or exit rates. The last group consists 
of unmarried individuals without children. This group has larger exit effects than the 
whole population, but no effect could be found on entry rates when activation was im-
plemented. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the improved incentives 
seem to primarily affect individuals on welfare, while the impact on non-welfare par-
ticipants is insignificant. However, there is large variation in how the reform has af-
fected different groups. In the population at risk of entering welfare dependency, the 
programs significantly reduce the entry rate, probably driven by young individuals. 
These young individuals may pursue further education instead and thus become eligible 
for study grants. It would be interesting in future research to determine whether this is 
the case. The exit effect seems to be driven by unmarried individuals without children. 
30  IFAU – Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants Both young individuals and single adults without children can be assumed to be fairly 
mobile in the labor market, and thus they might have more ability to respond to changes 
in incentives than other, less mobile groups. When interpreting these results, it is im-
portant to consider that the design and implementation of the activation program proba-
bly has a large impact on its effectiveness, especially for exit effects. 
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Table 19 Estimation results: entry and exit 
 (1)  (2) 
 Entry Exit 
Mandatory activation implemented  -0.002
*** 0.011
** 




 (0.000)  (0.002) 
Age -0.003
*** 0.001 





 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Born in Western country  0.008
*** -0.043
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003) 
Born in non-Western country  0.042
*** -0.100
*** 




 (0.000)  (0.002) 
Single parent  0.042
*** -0.060
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003) 
Compulsory schooling or less  0.019
*** -0.085
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.002) 
Some upper secondary education  -0.011
*** 0.051
*** 
 (0.000)  (0.003) 
Linear trend   Yes  Yes 
Year dummies   Yes  Yes 
City district dummies   Yes  Yes 
N 2,698,222  287,953 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 20 Estimation results: entry 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


















































































 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
1996 -0.007
*** -0.002
*** -0.010  -0.010
*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
1997 -0.007
*** -0.001  -0.002 -0.004 




































 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
2004 -0.014
*** 0.001
* -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
2005 -0.017
***      
 (0.001)       
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes  No 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,698,222  2,698,222 2,698,222  156 
S     tandard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 (1)  (2)  (3) 









 (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Spånga-Tensta -0.020
*** -0.006  0.001 




















































 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.043) 
1996 -0.004  0.001  0.040 




 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.040) 
1998 -0.006  0.003  0.045 




















 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.050) 
2003 0.001  0.026
*** 0.050 




 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.050) 
2005 -0.032
***    
 (0.006)     
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
N 287,953  287,953  287,953 
S     tandard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Year of implementation  -0.003
*** -0.001
** -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 




 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Two years or more after  -0.009
*** -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 














































































 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
1996 -0.007
*** -0.002
*** -0.010  -0.010
*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
1997 -0.007
*** -0.000  -0.002  -0.003 




































 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
2004 -0.013
*** 0.001  -0.003  -0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
2005 -0.014
***      
 (0.001)       
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,698,222  2,698,222 2,698,222  156 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 23 Results from estimations with time-specific treatment: exit 
  (1) (2) (3) 




  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
One year after  0.018
*** 0.014
** 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 









  (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Spånga-Tensta -0.018
*** -0.010  -0.001 




















































  (0.004) (0.004) (0.043) 
1996 -0.004  0.006  0.042 




  (0.004) (0.004) (0.040) 
1998 -0.005  0.011
** 0.048 




















  (0.005) (0.005) (0.050) 
2003 -0.010  0.030
*** 0.051 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.059) 
2004 -0.054
*** -0.009  -0.048 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.050) 
2005 -0.051
***    
 (0.006)     
Time-varying controls   No  No  Yes 
Linear trend   No  Yes  Yes 
N  287,953 287,953 287,953 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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